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1  Introduction  
In contemporary linguistics, causation is generally conceived of as a relation that 
holds between events. This is typically represented by a primitive relation CAUSE 
(e1, e2), which is meant to express that the occurrence of a causing event e1 causes 
a resulting event e2 to occur; see, e.g., Copley & Wolff 2014. Very rarely, excep-
tions to this standard case are mentioned that do not fit into the event-based pic-
ture of causation but rather suggest that – apart from events – certain stative enti-
ties may also enter into causal relations. For instance, Dowty (1979: 103) cites 
sentence (1), which he credits to Fillmore, as an instance of a stative causal rela-
tion; see also the discussion in Hobbs 2005: 207 and Solstad 2006: 97. 
(1) Mary’s living nearby causes John to prefer this neighborhood. 
                                                
*  The research reported here was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (project 
A1 of the SFB 833 “The Construction of Meaning”). We would like to thank our project mem-
bers, Sebastian Bücking, Frauke Buscher, Julia Lukassek, Anna Prysłopska, and Sarah Zobel, 
as well as the SALT 25 audience for very helpful comments and feedback. 
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Yet, beyond some rather cursory remarks, the case of stative causation has not 
received particular attention within linguistic research. More recently, Moltmann 
(2007, 2009, 2013, 2014) has argued for the ontological category of tropes as 
concrete property manifestations in an individual. According to Moltmann, tropes, 
such as the redness of an apple or Mary’s paleness, share with events the property 
of being causally efficacious. This is illustrated by sentence (2), which identifies 
Mary’s paleness as the cause for the shock; see Moltmann 2013: 301. 
(2) Mary is shockingly pale. 
Moltmann’s trope theory provides a starting point to explore in more detail the 
notion of stative causation. In the present paper, we will use German causal von-
modifiers (‘from’) as a means of gaining deeper insights into the linguistic ex-
pression of stative and eventive causation, what they have in common, and how 
they differ. Causal von-modifiers of adjectival copula sentences support an event-
ive as well as a stative causal reading. This is illustrated by the sentences in (3). 
(3) a.  Paul war müde von der Reise. eventive reading 
   Paul was tired from the trip 
 b.  Der Platz ist weiß von den Hagelkörnern. stative reading 
   The square is white from the hailstones 
In (3a), the von-phrase expresses an eventive causal relation between a trip and an 
event that results in Paul being tired. In (3b), in contrast, the causal relation does 
not hold among events but is of some stative nature. Informally speaking, the 
cause for the square being white is provided by some property related to the hail-
stones, viz. their whiteness. Furthermore, the hailstones are understood as being 
holistically located on the square. A sentence such as (4) is ambiguous.  
(4) Das Dach ist weiß von den Tauben. ambiguous 
The roof is white from the pigeons 
Besides its stative reading, according to which the roof’s whiteness is due to 
the whiteness of the pigeons (that are located all over the roof), it also has an 
eventive reading, according to which the roof is white, for instance, because some 
pigeons (which need not be present anymore) soiled it. As this example indicates, 
the interpretation of causal von may involve certain coercive adaptions as, for 
instance, the inference of a suitable event from a given object referent. 
In the present paper, we will argue that the ambiguity of causal von-modifiers 
observed in (3) and (4) can be accounted for parsimoniously if we develop an 
adequate notion of stative causation on a par with eventive causation. The struc-
ture of the article is as follows. In Section 2, we present four core observations 
concerning the interpretation of causal von-modifiers in adjectival copula sen-
tences that are to be explained. Section 3 is devoted to the ontology of events and 
tropes as causal relata. Section 4 develops a compositional semantics for causal 
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von that exploits syntactic differences for deriving eventive and stative readings 
from a single lexical entry and allows for coercive adaptions to account for the 
observed range of interpretive adjustments. The formal analysis is couched in 
terms of Asher’s (2011) Type Composition Logic. 
2  Core observations on German causal von-modifiers 
2.1  Preliminary remarks 
Let us start our discussion of causal von with a remark of caution. The interpre-
tations of German von and English from – although they overlap significantly – 
do not match exactly. In (5a) and (5b), for instance, von corresponds to from. 
However, whereas stative causal relations are expressed uniformly with von in 
German, English uses both from and with; see (5b-c). Furthermore, von is also 
used for the expression of agents as in (5d). 
(5) a.  Paul ist müde von der Reise.   Paul is tired from the trip. 
 b.  Das Gesicht war schwarz von dem Staub. The face was black from the dust. 
 c.  Der Hut war schwarz von/*mit Käfern. The hat was black *from/with bugs. 
 d.  Dieses Bild wurde von Paul gemalt. This picture was painted by Paul. 
Note furthermore that von appears to impose stronger restrictions than from on 
the kind of causal relation it may express. The English sentences in (6) were 
judged as well-formed by native speakers of English, but their respective German 
translations with von are ruled out as ungrammatical. In order to refer to such 
constellations in German, one would have to resort to the more liberal causal 
preposition wegen (‘because-of’); see (7).  
(6) a.  The light was pink from my rose-colored glasses. 
 b.  The square was blue from the nearby skyscraper. 
 c.  The living room was cold from the hole in the basement door. 
 d.  Paul was poor from bad investments. 
(7) a. * Das Licht war rosa von meiner rosé-getönten Brille. ✓ wegen 
 b. * Der Platz war blau von dem nahen Wolkenkratzer. ✓ wegen 
 c. * Das Wohnzimmer war kalt von dem Loch in der Kellertür. ✓ wegen 
 d. * Paul war arm von schlechten Geldanlagen.  ✓ wegen 
Thus, there is a subtle but significant difference between the causal relations 
expressed by German von and English from. This should be kept in mind through-
out the paper. We will discuss the particular restrictions on causation imposed by 
von in Section 3.  
A second remark concerns the case of von-arguments. Some adjectives and 
adjectivized participles take von-PPs as arguments; see (8).  
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(8) a.  Die Schüssel ist voll von  / mit Kirschen. 
   The bowl is full of / with cherries 
 b.  Unsere Früchte sind frei von Pestiziden. 
   Our fruits are free of pesticides 
 c.  Paul ist beeindruckt / enttäuscht von Marias Vortrag. 
   Paul is impressed / disappointed by Maria’s talk 
Adjectives such as voll (‘full’) or frei (‘free’) are inherently relational and se-
lect for an internal argument. Similarly, adjectivized participles such as be-
eindruckt (‘impressed’) or enttäuscht (‘disappointed’) inherit a stimulus argument 
from their verbal base. Adjectival von-arguments fall outside the scope of the pre-
sent paper. Here, we are only interested in von-PPs that do not fill a dedicated 
argument slot but act as modifiers. 
In the following, we will present four core observations concerning the inter-
pretation of causal von-modifiers that our semantic analysis strives to account for.  
2.2  Inference patterns 
Eventive and stative readings of causal von-modifiers differ with respect to two 
inferential patterns. First, only stative von supports the inference that von’s inter-
nal NP-referent is located on the subject referent at the predication time; see (9). 
(9) a.  Der Platz ist weiß von den Hagelkörnern. → The hailstones are  
   The square is white from the  hailstones  on the square. 
 b.  Die Bank ist dreckig von den Schuhen. ↛ The shoes are on  
   The bench is dirty from the shoes    the bench. 
For (9a) to be true, the hailstones must be located on the square at the predica-
tion time. This is not the case for (9b). The shoes may still be on the bench, but 
they don’t need to be. Their location is irrelevant for the truth conditions of (9b). 
Secondly, only stative von implies that the main predicate also holds for von’s 
internal NP-referent at the predication time. This can easily be observed in a case 
like (10a) with the newly invented fantasy noun Mimbeln (‘mimbles’). There is no 
world knowledge available about mimbles. So we have no expectations about 
their color. Nevertheless, from (10a) we conclude that the mimbles must be white. 
No such inference is valid in the case of eventive causal von-modifiers; see (10b). 
(10) a.  Der Platz ist weiß von den Mimbeln. → The mimbles are  
   The square is white from the  mimbles  white. 
 b.  Die Bank ist dreckig von den Schuhen. ↛ The shoes are  
   The bench is dirty from the shoes    dirty. 
That is, stative von supports – roughly speaking – some kind of “property 
transfer” from von’s internal NP-referent to the subject referent. In (10a), the 
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square’s whiteness is inherited from the whiteness of the mimbles. There is a cer-
tain margin of freedom in inferring the relevant property though. In (11), for in-
stance, the adjective bleich carries a selectional restriction for human beings. This 
restriction is not met by flour dust. The respective property, for which the infer-
ence pattern holds, is that of having a bright, almost white color in this case. 
(11) Ihr Gesicht war bleich von Mehlstaub.  
 Her face was pale from flour-dust 
The two inference patterns illustrated in (9) and (10) may serve as diagnostics 
for differentiating eventive and stative readings of causal von; see Herdtfelder & 
Maienborn 2015 for a corpus study on causal von-modifiers in adjectival copula 
sentences which was based on these diagnostics.  
2.3  Holistic effect 
As already mentioned in the introduction, a prominent feature of von’s stative 
reading is the holistic interpretation of its internal NP-referent. In the sentences in 
(12), the internal NP-referent is interpreted as being located all over (relevant 
parts of) the subject referent.  
(12) a.  Der Boden war schwarz von Ameisen. 
   The floor was black from ants 
 b.  Die Luft ist schwer von Blütenduft. 
   The air is thick from blossom-scent 
Rapoport (2014) has argued for the parallel case of with (e.g., The floor was 
black with ants.) that the observed holistic effect is due to the particular semantics 
of the preposition with (rather than being construction-specific). In the same spir-
it, we will argue in Section 3 that the holistic effect can be derived from the se-
mantics of von. More specifically, we will propose that it follows from the condi-
tions on spatiotemporal contiguity imposed on stative causation. 
2.4  Direct causation 
Causal von-PPs express non-agentive causal relations. The cause is neither in con-
trol of the event (i.e., an agent) nor under external control (i.e., an instrument); 
e.g., DeLancey 1984. More specifically, von’s internal NP-referent is qualified as 
a non-volitional cause; see the notion of a “causer,” e.g., in Rappaport Hovav & 
Levin 2000, Alexiadou & Schäfer 2006, Rothmayr 2009, and Schäfer 2012. 
Moreover, causal von is restricted to expressing a narrow notion of “direct 
causation.” The distinction between direct vs. indirect causation is a widely dis-
cussed opposition within the literature on causation; see, e.g., Shibatani 1976, 
Talmy 1976, Dowty 1979: 98f, Wolff 2003, Vecchiato 2011, and Copley & Wolff 
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2014. Direct causation is commonly understood as an immediate causal relation-
ship between a cause and an effect without intervening entities, whereas indirect 
causation allows cause and effect to be related via longer causal chains. Take (13) 
as an illustration.  
(13) a.  Paul ist müde von der Reise. 
   Paul is tired from the trip 
 b.  Paul ist müde wegen der Reise. 
   Paul is tired because-of the trip 
In (13a) von requires that there is an immediate, non-interrupted relationship 
between the trip and Paul becoming tired: First of all, Paul must have taken part in 
the trip. Secondly, von implies a temporal ordering according to which the trip 
must precede Paul’s tiredness, and, furthermore, no (significant) temporal gap is 
permitted between the trip and the onset of Paul’s tiredness. For instance, (13a) 
could not refer to a situation in which Paul takes part in a trip and – in order to 
relax his stiff limbs – mows the lawn upon his return home and only afterwards 
becomes tired. Causal von differs sharply from the more liberal causal preposition 
wegen (‘because-of’) in this respect. The wegen-sentence (13b) only requires that 
the trip somehow relates to the cause of Paul’s tiredness. Paul is neither required 
to take part in the trip nor are there any temporal restrictions. For instance, (13b) 
might well refer to a situation where Paul is planning a future trip or is suffering 
from nightmares about a trip that took place long ago. Such scenarios are exclud-
ed for von. Similar conditions hold for the case of stative causal von. Sentence 
(14a) requires spatial and temporal contiguity between the ants being on the floor 
and the floor being black. The ants must be located on the floor at the time of the 
predication; see the inference pattern in (9). The wegen-sentence (14b), by con-
trast, also tolerates an indirect causal relationship, where no spatiotemporal conti-
guity between cause and effect holds. For instance, (14b) could refer to a situation 
where the floor is painted black because this keeps ants away.  
(14) a.  Der Boden ist schwarz von den Ameisen. 
   The floor is black from the ants    
 b.  Der Boden ist schwarz wegen der Ameisen. 
   The floor is black because-of the ants 
Several definitions of direct causation have been suggested, mostly in connec-
tion with a discussion of lexical vs. periphrastic causatives; see, e.g., Shibatani 
1976 and Vecchiato 2011. In the following, we will adopt Wolff’s (2003) No-
intervening-cause criterion: 
(15) No-intervening-cause criterion: 
 Direct causation is present between the causer and the final causee in a 
causal chain (1) if there are no intermediate entities at the same level of 
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granularity as either the initial causer or final causee, or (2) if any inter-
mediate entities that are present can be construed as an enabling condition 
rather than an intervening causer.   Wolff 2003: 4f 
We have already seen an illustration of Wolff’s first condition on direct causa-
tion when discussing sentence (13a): von, as representative for direct causation, 
requires that Paul’s trip immediately leads to his tiredness. No intervening event 
of the same level of granularity, such as, for instance, the mowing of his lawn, is 
tolerated. The preposition wegen, in contrast, would be fine in such a scenario of 
indirect causation. That is, causal chains that are referred to by wegen do not have 
to meet Wolff’s No-intervening-cause criterion.1 
Note that direct causation differs from indirect causation in not being transi-
tive. Transitivity is generally considered a core property of causation; see, e.g., 
Lewis 1973: 563. However, it only holds for indirect causation. (16) illustrates 
that the causal relation expressed by von is in fact non-transitive and differs from 
wegen in this respect. If the bench is dirty from the shoes (16a), and the shoes are 
dirty from the hike (16b), it does not follow that the bench is dirty from the hike 
(16c), but we may only conclude that the bench is dirty because of the hike (16d). 
(16) a.  Die Bank ist dreckig von den Schuhen. (bench dirty from shoes) 
 b.  Die Schuhe sind dreckig von der Wanderung. (shoes dirty from hike) 
 c. ↛ Die Bank ist dreckig von der Wanderung. (bench dirty from hike) 
 d. → Die Bank ist dreckig wegen der Wanderung.  (b. dirty because-of hike) 
In sum, causal von-modifiers express a narrow notion of direct causation in 
the sense of Wolff (2003), which is non-transitive and imposes particular condi-
tions on spatiotemporal contiguity between the cause and its effect. These condi-
tions will be spelled-out in Section 3.  
2.5  Coercion 
Finally, it is worth noting that causal von tolerates certain coercive adaptions in 
case of type mismatches. To give just one example, eventive causal von requires 
an internal argument of type event. This causing event might be given either ex-
plicitly, as, for example, the trip in (13a), or, alternatively, in case of a type con-
flict, it might also be inferred from an object referent as in (17). The symbol ‘↝’ is 
used for pragmatic inferences based on world knowledge. 
                                                
1  The second condition in Wolff’s definition of direct causation ensures that the use of an in-
strument by an agent does not count as intervening cause, whereas a second volitional agent 
would count as an intervening cause. Since we already established above that causal von is re-
served for non-agentive causation, Wolff’s second condition can be neglected for our purposes. 
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(17) a.  Paul war satt von der Pizza. ↝ from eating the pizza 
   Paul was full from the pizza    
 b.  Paul war müde von den Tabletten. ↝ from the release of their in- 
   Paul was tired from the pills   gredients (after taking them) 
In (17a), the most natural cause for being full that is related to a pizza is an 
eating event. For (17b), an obvious reason related to the pills for Paul becoming 
tired is the release of the ingredients of the pills after taking them. Yet, in an ap-
propriate context (17b) could also be interpreted as expressing that Paul became 
tired by some action that he performed with the pills, for instance, checking their 
expiry date. That is, the interpretation of sentences such as (17) is based on event 
coercion: a combinatory conflict is resolved by accommodating a contextually 
appropriate event based on the given object referent. 
The semantic approach that we develop in the following aims at accounting 
for the above core observations concerning the interpretation of causal von. 
3  Ontology: Events and tropes as causal relata 
As mentioned in the introduction, current linguistic theories generally take caus-
ation to be a relation that holds between events, for example, Eckardt 2000, 
Hobbs 2005, and Vecchiato 2011 among many others. Moltmann (2007, 2009, 
2013, 2014) extends this view by arguing for an ontological category of tropes, 
which shares with events the property of having causal force. Tropes are concrete 
property manifestations in an individual. They act as implicit arguments of adjec-
tives and can be referred to by adjective nominalizations such as German Schön-
heit ‘beauty’, and Zufriedenheit ‘satisfaction’ or English redness, happiness, and 
paleness. Trope arguments are targeted by modifiers such as the ones in (18). As 
Moltmann (2013: 300) points out, “these modifiers represent precisely the kinds 
of properties that tropes are supposed to have, such as properties of causal effect, 
of perception, and of particular manifestation.” 2 
(18) a.  Mary is visibly / profoundly happy. 
 b.  Mary is extremely / frighteningly pale. 
For the present purposes (19) may serve as an illustration for a trope-based 
semantics of an adjective such as white. The variable x ranges over physical ob-
jects, i.e., x is of type phys, and the variable r is of type trope. ‘BEARER’ stands for 
the bearerhood relation relating a trope to its bearer; see Moltmann 2013: 302f.  
(19) weiß (‘white’): λx:phys λr:trope [BEARER (x, r) & WHITENESS (r)] 
                                                
2 See Maienborn 2015 for an overview of the ontological properties of events and tropes as 
opposed to (certain) states. 
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Adopting Moltmann’s notion of tropes, we want to propose that causation 
holds either between events or between tropes. Thus, the causal relata are either of 
type event or of type trope as in (20). (20a) covers the case of eventive causation 
and (20b) that of stative causation.3 
(20) a.  CAUSE (e1, e2) with e1, e2 as variables over events 
 b.  CAUSE (r1, r2) with r1, r2 as variables over tropes 
Note that abstract (Kimian) states don’t have causal force and hence don’t pat-
tern with events and tropes in this respect. The minimal pair in (21) compares a 
trope referring adjectival nominalization with a nominalized infinitival copular 
expression, which refers to K-states (e.g., Bücking 2012, Moltmann 2014). As 
(21) shows, only the former are legitimate arguments of causal von-modifiers. 
That is, the concrete humidity of the air causes the beds to be wet; see (21a). The 
K-state of the air being humid, in contrast, has no causal force; see (21b). 
(21) a.  Die Betten waren nass von der Luftfeuchtigkeit. 
   The beds were wet from the air-humidity 
 b. * Die Betten waren nass vom Feucht-Sein der Luft. 
   The beds were wet from.the humid-be.inf of.the air 
The two causal patterns in (20) provide the ontological basis for spelling out 
the notion of direct causation. The conditions on spatiotemporal contiguity that 
are imposed by direct causation are formulated in the following ontological axi-
oms. (The functions τ and π map eventualities and tropes onto their temporal and 
spatial dimensions respectively.) 
(22) Spatiotemporal contiguity axioms for eventive causation:4 
 a.  ∀e1 ∀e2 CAUSE (e1, e2) → τ(e1) ⊃⊂  τ(e2) ⊃⊂  : temporal abutment 
 b.  ∀e1 ∀e2 CAUSE (e1, e2) → π(e1) ∘	  π(e2) ∘: spatial contact 
                                                
3  The causal patterns in (20) require that their arguments are of the same type. Either both argu-
ments are of type event, or they are both of type trope. The two remaining logical possibilities 
(i) and (ii) are ruled out for conceptual reasons.  
(i) CAUSE (e, r) 
(ii) CAUSE (r, e) 
 As to (i), an event can only cause a change of state, i.e., the initiation of a trope but not a bare 
trope per se. As to (ii), to cause an event requires some dynamic input, a transition. Again, a 
bare trope cannot initiate an event. So, the two patterns in (20) are, in fact, the only available 
options of how direct causation can be realized; see also Schaffer’s (2014) metaphysical har-
mony requirement for causal relata. 
4  Our formulation of the conditions on spatiotemporal contiguity for the eventive case is similar 
in spirit to Vecchiato’s (2011: 170) definition. Vecchiato does not take into account stative 
causation though. See, e.g., Kamp & Reyle 1993 for the temporal relation of abutment. 
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In the eventive case, the causing event e1 immediately precedes the resulting 
event e2; see (22a). And there is some kind of physical contact between the two 
events. This is formulated in (22b) in terms of spatial contact. For the case of 
eventive causal von, this amounts to demanding that the bearer of the resulting 
trope must be in spatial contact with e1, typically by taking part in e1.  
The axioms in (23) account for the respective conditions in the stative case: 
The temporal extension of the resulting trope r2 lies within the temporal extension 
of the causing trope r1; see (23a). And r2’s spatial extension is included by the 
spatial extension of r1; see (23b). 
(23) Spatiotemporal contiguity axioms for stative causation: 
 a.  ∀r1 ∀r2 CAUSE (r1, r2) → τ(r1) ⊇ τ(r2) 
 b.  ∀r1 ∀r2 CAUSE (r1, r2) → π(r1) ⊇ π(r2) 
The ontological axioms in (22) and (23) spell out the conditions on direct cau-
sation that we identified in Section 2.4. They are independently motivated due to 
the spatiotemporal nature of events and tropes and they provide a straightforward 
explanation of some of causal von’s core properties observed in Section 2. In par-
ticular, they account for the inferential pattern in (9), and they provide an explana-
tion for the characteristic holistic effect observed for the stative reading of causal 
von. 
According to the inference pattern in (9), stative von implies that von’s inter-
nal NP referent is located on the subject referent at the time of the predication. 
This inference follows from the axiom (23b). Since tropes are dependent on their 
bearers, spatial inclusion among tropes implies spatial contact between their bear-
ers. That is, in order for the spatial extension of the resulting trope r2 to fall within 
the spatial extension of the causing trope r1, the bearer of r1 must be located on the 
bearer of r2.  
Next, what about the holistic effect of stative causal von? Why is it that in 
(3b), for instance, the hailstones are understood as being located all over (relevant 
parts of) the square? This can be explained with reference to a general “totality 
condition” on predication: The arguments of a predicate are indivisible with re-
spect to the predication; see Löbner 2000.5 In the case of (3b), for example, the 
predication of being white holds for (the surface of) the whole square. That is, the 
spatial extension of the square’s whiteness covers the whole square. Therefore – 
given (23b) – the spatial extension of the hailstones’ whiteness must include this 
region. From this it follows that the square is covered by the hailstones. This ex-
plains the characteristic holistic effect observed with the stative reading of causal 
von. The holistic interpretation is accounted for on the basis of independently mo-
                                                
5  Löbner (2000: 239) formulates this totality condition in terms of a Presupposition of Indivisi-
bility: “Whenever a predicate is applied to one of its arguments, it is true or false of the argu-
ment as a whole.” 
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tivated assumptions concerning spatiotemporal contiguity restrictions on trope 
causation and on the nature of predication. Our explanation shares with Rapoport 
(2014) the assumption that the source of the holistic interpretation is to be found 
in the semantics of the preposition; see Section 2.3. With (23) we propose an on-
tologically grounded implementation of this assumption. 
So far, we have developed a semantic analysis of causal von in terms of direct 
causation that reduces the differences between its eventive and its stative readings 
to a sortal contrast. The causal relation holds either between events or between 
tropes with their respective spatiotemporal contiguity conditions. Interpretive 
characteristics, such as the holistic effect observed with the stative reading of 
causal von, follow from these assumptions straightforwardly. In the following, we 
will show that the selection for the sortal type, event or trope, and hence for von’s 
reading, is triggered by the syntactic position of the modifier. 
4  A compositional semantics for causal von-modifiers 
4.1  Two syntactic adjunction sites 
In this section we will sketch our core assumptions concerning the syntax of caus-
al von-modifiers, which provide the starting point for our compositional approach. 
Due to lack of space these assumptions will only be motivated with some findings 
from our corpus study, but see Maienborn & Herdtfelder 2015 for a more thor-
ough discussion of the syntax of causal von-modifiers.  
The corpus study reported in Herdtfelder & Maienborn 2015 comprises 358 
adjectival copula sentences with causal von-modifiers. Based on the two inference 
patterns in (9) and (10), 249 of them were classified as eventive and 109 as sta-
tive. Furthermore, the sentences were analyzed with respect to (i) the (non-)adja-
cency of the adjective and the von-PP, and (ii) the syntactic order of the adjective 
and the von-PP in the case of adjacency. The relevant findings are the following: 
(24) Eventive reading: 
 (i) 88% adjacent, 12% non-adjacent 
 (ii) 75% Adj > PP, 25% PP > Adj 
(25) Stative reading: 
 (i) 97% adjacent, 3% non-adjacent  
 (ii) 94% Adj > PP, 6% PP > Adj 
The data in (24) and (25) show that the order Adj > PP is the unmarked order 
for both readings. Deviations from this order are particularly marked in infor-
mation structural terms; see Herdtfelder & Maienborn 2015 for details. These data 
support the view that Adj > PP is the base order. Given that German is verb final, 
this implies that the causal von-modifier must be part of the AP. Otherwise the 
Maienborn and Herdtfelder 
 174 
copula could not combine first with its AP-complement. Thus, from these obser-
vations we may conclude that the von-PP is a modifier that adjoins to some pro-
jection of the adjective.  
The corpus data show furthermore that – beyond this basic conformity – the 
two readings differ with respect to both the extent of the PP’s adjacency to the 
adjective and its syntactic mobility. A χ2 test (e.g., Siegel 1956) revealed that non-
adjacency is significantly less frequent for the stative vs. the eventive reading (3% 
vs. 12%; χ2(1) = 7.83, p < .05). And a second, independent χ2 test revealed that in 
the adjacent cases the order PP > Adj is significantly less frequent for the stative 
vs. the eventive reading (6% vs. 25%; χ2(1) = 17.73, p < .01). Thus, the two read-
ings are accompanied by characteristic distributional differences. Specifically, the 
corpus data support the view that stative von is positioned closer to the adjective 
than eventive von and does not admit intervening linguistic material. This hints at 
the possibility of different AP-internal base adjunction sites. For the time being, 
we will account for these observed differences by assuming that eventive von 
adjoins at the AP-periphery (AP-adjunct), whereas stative von has a base position 
in the immediate vicinity of the adjective (A-adjunct). See Maienborn & 
Herdtfelder 2015 for a more thorough discussion, where this assumption is further 
supported by a series of additional syntactic and semantic diagnostics. 
4.2  Compositional semantics with type accommodation 
The previous section has established a correlation between the semantic inter-
pretation of a causal von-modifier (eventive or stative) and its syntactic position 
(AP-adjunct or A-adjunct). This may serve as the starting point for developing a 
compositional solution. Our analysis of the compositional semantics of causal 
von-modifiers will be spelled out in Asher’s (2011) Type Composition Logic 
(TCL), which provides us with a context-sensitive model of type driven lexical 
semantics. Basically, TCL assumes two levels of semantic representation: a level 
of Logical Form with the usual model-theoretic interpretation, and a level of types 
with a proof-theoretic interpretation. Types, which Asher conceives of as mental 
concepts, may convey arbitrarily fine-grained information organized in terms of a 
type hierarchy.  
Let us begin by providing the semantic ingredients for the stative reading of 
von in (3b).6 The lexical entry for an adjective such as white was already intro-
duced in (19) and is repeated in (26). Furthermore, we assume an operation of 
Existential Trope Closure (ETC) at the AP-boundary as in (27). ETC binds the 
adjective’s trope argument existentially and introduces an argument for a Kimian 
                                                
6  For ease and brevity of presentation we will use a simplified TCL notation. A variable’s type is 
added in bold face after a column. Furthermore, to save space and to improve readability, type 
information will be omitted if a variable’s type is either clear or irrelevant in a given context. 
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state (see Section 3) at which the bearerhood relation holds. (28) provides the 
lexical entry for the copula sein (‘to be’), and in (29) the minimal part of an I0-
semantics is given that is of interest here. Its core contribution consists in the exis-
tential binding of the VP’s eventive or stative argument. The semantic representa-
tion of definite NPs will be abbreviated as in (30).  
(26) weiß (‘white’): λx:phys λr:tr [BEARER (x, r) & WHITENESS (r)] 
(27) Existential trope closure (ETC): λP λx λs:st ∃r:tr [s: P (x)(r)] 
(28) sein (‘to be’): λP λx λs:st [P (x)(s)] 
(29) I0:  λP λx ∃s:ev⊔st [P (x)(s)] 
(30) der Platz (‘the square’):  DEF x:phys [SQUARE (x)] or: def-sqphys 
The relevant steps of a compositional derivation for a simple copula sentence are 
given in (31). Thus, the sentence expresses that there is a K-state s at which the 
square is the bearer of a concrete manifestation of whiteness r. 
(31) a.  [AP weiß]: λP λx λs ∃r [s: P(x)(r)] (λx λr [BEARER (x, r) & WHITENESS (r)]) 
     = λx λs:st ∃r:tr [s: BEARER (x, r) & WHITENESS (r)]  
 b.  [VP [AP weiß] sei-]:  
   λP λx λs:st [P (x)(s)] (λx λs ∃r [s: BEARER (x, r) & WHITENESS (r)]) 
   = λx λs:st ∃r:tr [s: BEARER (x, r) & WHITENESS (r)] 
 c.  [I’ [VP [AP weiß] war]]:  
   λP λx ∃s [P (x)(s)] (λx λs ∃r [s: BEARER (x, r) & WHITENESS (r)]) 
   = λx ∃s:st ∃r:tr [s: BEARER (x, r) & WHITENESS (r)] 
 d.  [IP der Platz [VP [AP weiß] war]]:  
   λx ∃s ∃r [s: BEARER (x, r) & WHITENESS (r)] (def-sqphys) 
   = ∃s:st ∃r:tr [s: BEARER (def-sqphys, r) & WHITENESS (r)] 
Now, what about stative von? A straightforward implementation of our obser-
vations concerning the interpretation of stative von in the previous sections leads 
to (32) as the lexical entry. 
(32) von (‘from’):         stative reading 
 λc:tr – tr (HD(c)⊑phys) λc’:tr [CAUSE (c, c’)] 
According to (32), von expresses a causal relation between two arguments c and 
c’ which are both required to be of type tr(ope). Additionally, measures are taken 
in order to accommodate the type of von’s internal argument c in case of a type 
conflict. This is modeled with Asher’s so-called “polymorphic” types – a special 
kind of complex types whose value is specified in dependence on other argu-
ments; see Asher 2011: Section 8.2. Polymorphic types play a crucial role in Ash-
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er’s handling of coercion. If there is a type clash in the course of composition, i.e., 
the type of a compositionally provided argument does not meet the type require-
ments of the predicate, type accommodation via polymorphic types may take 
place. More specifically, our simplified notation of a polymorphic type ‘α – α(β)’ 
is to be understood as expressing that if a type requirement α cannot be met com-
positionally, α may be justified via β. That is, in case of a type clash, type ac-
commodation may license the introduction of a new variable of type α, whose 
type value is further specified dependent on the compositionally supplied type 
β. Notably, Asher (2011: Sections 3.5, 8.1) argues that coercion is crucially a mat-
ter of lexical semantics, not of general pragmatics. That is, whether or not a po-
tential type clash may be resolved is something that must be determined in ad-
vance in the lexicon. In our case, the lexical entry for stative von in (32) establish-
es that von’s internal argument c is regularly expected to be of type trope. Yet, if 
this type requirement is not met but the internal argument c is a physical object 
(i.e., a subtype of phys), then a trope argument may be accommodated based on 
c’s type. (The head type function HD(c) maps c onto its most specific type.) 
The compositional derivation for von’s stative reading in sentence (3b) is pro-
vided in (33). The combination of von with the NP den Hagelkörnern leads to a 
type clash in (33a) (trope vs. phys). Due to von’s polymorphic type, type accom-
modation may take place as in (33b). Note that type accommodation – which is a 
matter of the “internal semantics” – is accompanied by a transfer rule that mirrors 
the adaption at the level of LF. In our case, an existentially bound variable c of 
type tr(h-stone) – i.e., a hailstone-dependent trope –  is introduced into LF which 
is related to the hailstones through the underspecified predicate φtr(h-stone). We as-
sume a run-of-the-mill semantics for intersective modification, which leads to 
(33c) when combining the adjective with the von-PP; see, e.g., Heim & Kratzer’s 
(1998) composition rule of predicate modification. At the AP-boundary, ETC 
applies; see (33d). This and the following steps are the same as in the case of the 
simple copula sentence (31). The resulting semantic representation for von’s sta-
tive reading in (3b) is given in (33e).  
(33) Der Platz war weiß von den Hagelkörnern. 
 a.  [PP von den Hagelkörnern]:   
   λc:tr – tr (HD(c)⊑phys) λc’:tr [CAUSE (c, c’)] (def-h-stphys) 
 b.  = λc’:tr ∃c:tr(h-stone) [CAUSE (c, c’) & φtr(h-stone) (c, def-h-stphys)] 
 c.  [A [A weiß] [PP von den Hagelkörnern]]:  
   λx:phys λr:tr ∃c:tr(h-stone) [BEARER(x, r) & WHITENESS(r)  
   & CAUSE(c, r) & φtr(h-stone) (c, def-h-stphys)] 
 d.  [AP [A [A weiß] [PP von den Hagelkörnern]]]:  
   λx λs:st ∃r:tr ∃c:tr(h-stone) [s: BEARER (x, r) & WHITENESS (r)  
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   & CAUSE (c, r) & φtr(h-st) (c, def-h-stphys)] 
 e.  [IP der Platz [VP [AP [A [A weiß] [PP von den Hagelkörnern]]] war]]:  
   ∃s:st ∃r:tr ∃c:tr(h-stone) [s: BEARER (def-h-stphys, r) & WHITENESS(r) 
   & CAUSE (c, r) & φtr(h-stone) (c, def-h-stphys)] 
In prose: There is a state s of a definite square being the bearer of a whiteness 
r which is caused by a trope c that is related in a semantically underspecified way 
to some definite hailstones. This is how far the compositional semantics gets us. 
Before turning to the pragmatic specification for c, let us first spell out von’s 
eventive reading. The eventive variant of von’s lexical entry is provided in (34). 
(34) von (‘from’):        eventive reading 
 λc:ev – ev (HD(c)⊑phys) λc’:ev – become (HD(c’)⊑st) [CAUSE (c, c’)] 
Eventive causal von patterns with stative causal von in tolerating internal ar-
guments that denote physical objects. That is, if von’s internal argument c is not 
of the requested type ev(ent) but rather phys, type accommodation may take place. 
Additionally, eventive causal von also tolerates type accommodation for its exter-
nal argument. This is regularly expected to be of type event. However, apart from 
combining with eventive expressions (e.g., Cleopatra died from a snake bite.) or 
with the eventive copula werden/to become (e.g., Anna became tired from run-
ning.), eventive causal von-modifiers also tolerate external arguments of type state 
and coerce them into the result state of a hidden become operator. That is, if the 
modifier’s target argument c’ is not of the expected type event but of type state, 
this type clash can be resolved by inserting an event variable – more specifically, 
a becoming event that is dependent on the given state. (35) illustrates the deriva-
tion of the compositional semantics for (3a). Observe that von’s internal NP der 
Reise (‘the trip’) is of type event. Thus, no type accommodation is required to 
compute the semantic representation of the PP; see (35a). Note furthermore that 
there is no way to combine the von-modifier directly with the adjective. Within 
the lexical entry of eventive von no provisions are made to accommodate a trope 
argument in the c’-position. This implies that an eventive von-modifier can only 
combine with an adjectival predicate after the ETC operation has taken place; see 
(35b). This accounts for our syntactic observations from Section 4.1: Eventive 
von adjoins at the AP-periphery. The combination exploits the lexically licensed 
type accommodation that introduces an event argument c’ that is dependent on the 
adjectival state; see (35c). The subsequent composition proceeds as usual leading 
to (35d) as final semantic representation. 
(35) Paul war müde von der Reise.  (‘Paul was tired from the trip.’) 
 a.  [PP von der Reise]:  
   λc’:ev – become (HD(c’)⊑st) [CAUSE (def-tripev, c’)] 
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 b.  [AP müde]:  λx λs:st ∃r:tr [s: BEARER (x, r) & TIREDNESS (r)] 
 c.  [AP [AP müde] [PP von der Reise]]:  
   λx λs:st ∃c’:become(st)  ∃r:tr [s: BEARER (x, r) & TIREDNESS (r) 
   & CAUSE (def-tripev, c’) & φbecome(st) (c’, s)] 
 d.  [IP Paul [VP [AP [AP müde] [PP von der Reise]] war]]:   
   ∃s:st ∃c’:become(st) ∃r:tr [s: BEARER (Paul, r) & TIREDNESS (r) 
   & CAUSE (def-tripev, c’) & φbecome(st) (c’, s)] 
In prose: There is a state s of Paul being the bearer of a tiredness r whose start 
c’ was caused by a definite trip. Note that – although an eventive argument c’ was 
inserted to resolve the type clash in (35c) – the AP’s state argument s is the one 
that remains compositionally active afterwards. That is, the given type accommo-
dation is a local operation that does not affect the interpretation and later compo-
sitional behavior of the expression; it only affects the local predication (see Asher 
2011: 223). In other words, a sentence such as (35) – although it requires the ac-
commodation of an event – is still stative. 
The interpretation of a sentence such as (17a) requires type accommodation 
for both von’s internal and its external argument. The resulting semantic represen-
tation is provided in (36): There is a state of Paul being the bearer of a fullness 
that was initiated by an underspecified event related to a definite pizza. 
(36) Paul war satt von der Pizza.  (‘Paul was full from the pizza.’) 
 ∃s:st ∃c’:become(st) ∃r:tr ∃e:ev(pizza) [s: BEARER (Paul, r) & FULLNESS (r) 
 & CAUSE (e, c’) & φev(pizza) (e, def-pizzaphys) & φbecome(st) (c’, s)] 
The stative and eventive variants of causal von in (32) and (34) can be merged 
into a single lexical entry: 
(37) Lexical entry for causal von:  (eventive and stative reading) 
 λc:ev⊔tr – ev⊔tr(HD(c)⊑phys) λc’:ev⊔tr – become(HD(c’)⊑st) [CAUSE (c, c’)] 
The lexical entry in (37) summarizes the lexical part of our analysis. It deter-
mines that von’s causal relata belong to the summation of the domains of events 
and tropes, and it licenses type accommodation if the causer argument c is instead 
a physical object. As for c’, type accommodation is only available in the eventive 
case, provided that the compositionally supplied target is of type state. (37) en-
sures that the stative reading of causal von can only be generated if the modifier 
adjoins before the ETC operation takes place, i.e., the stative reading is based on 
A-adjunction, whereas the eventive reading can only be derived after ETC, if the 
modifier is adjoined at the AP-level. Thus, (37) accounts for the observed syntac-
tic distribution of the two von-versions based on a single lexical entry with maxi-
mally identical semantic content. 
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4.3  Pragmatic type specification 
The last piece of our analysis concerns the pragmatic specification of the Logical 
Form. Those underspecified predicates that were introduced to solve a type con-
flict require a type specification process that is modeled in TCL in terms of a 
modal logic with a weak conditional operator ‘>’; see Asher 2011: 227ff. In (38), 
two such type specification rules are provided for illustration. Their application 
yields plausible interpretations for (36) and (33).  
(38) Defeasible type specification rules   (‘>’: weak conditional) 
 a.  α⊑food & β⊑animate & CAUSE (event(β, α), become(state(fullness (β))))  
   > event (β, α) = eat (β, α) 
 b.  α⊑phys & γ⊑phys & β(γ)⊑optic⊔haptic_tr(γ) & CAUSE (trope (α), β(γ))  
   > trope (α) = β(α) 
The rule in (38a) says that if α is a subtype of food, and β is a subtype of an 
animate being, and some event involving individuals of type β and α initiates a 
state of the individual of type β exhibiting fullness, then this event most probably 
is an eating event. Rule (38a) provides us with a plausible pragmatic specification 
for (36). While the compositional semantics remains underspecified with respect 
to the kind of event that caused the fullness, drawing the inference in (38a) leads 
to (39) as a pragmatically specified sentence interpretation for (36).7 
(39) Paul war satt von der Pizza.  
 ∃s ∃c’ ∃r ∃e [s: BEARER (Paul, r) & FULLNESS (r) & CAUSE (e, c’) 
 & EAT (e, Paul, def-pizza) & BECOME (c’, s)] 
Rules such as (38a) reflect our world knowledge and they may take into ac-
count further factors such as context and plausibility; see our remarks on several 
pragmatic specification options for (17b) in Section 2.5. 
Finally, to account for the stative case we propose the inference rule in (38b): 
If some trope of a physical object of type α causes an optic or haptic trope β in a 
physical object of type γ, then that trope corresponds to β. For (33) this yields (40) 
as a pragmatic specification. 
(40) Der Platz war weiß von den Hagelkörnern.  
 ∃s ∃c’ ∃c [s: BEARER (def-square, c’) & WHITENESS (c’) & CAUSE (c, c’) 
 & BEARER (def-h-stones, c) & WHITENESS (c)] 
According to (40), the square’s whiteness is due to the whiteness of the hail-
stones. The rule (38b) accounts for the observation that the stative reading of 
                                                
7  A full formal specification will have to take into account additional arguments such as the 
agent of eating. For the moment, we set aside these technical details. 
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causal von-modifiers is only licensed in combination with adjectives that denote 
optic or haptic properties; see Herdtfelder & Maienborn 2015. Our analysis allows 
for the derivation of underspecified semantic representations with any kind of 
tropes, but then type justification fails, because there are no further type specifica-
tion rules apart from (38b). That is, no well-formed type specification can be de-
rived. The rule in (38b) is the source of the inference pattern (10), which we used 
as a diagnostic for von’s stative reading in Section 2. And it provides an explana-
tion for the intuitive impression mentioned in the beginning that there is some 
kind of “property transfer” from the cause to the effect. 
To sum up, the present paper has developed a semantic analysis of causal von-
modifiers that accounts for the core empirical observations concerning the combi-
natorics and interpretation of causal von that we presented in Section 2. The even-
tive/stative ambiguity that we diagnosed for causal von could be traced back to a 
sortal contrast of the causal relata, which can be either events or tropes. Further-
more, this sortal contrast was argued to be reflected by the syntax. We proposed 
that eventive and stative von-modifiers occupy distinct syntactic base positions: 
Stative von is adjoined to A, and eventive von adjoins to AP. Based on this syn-
tactic difference, we presented a compositional account that derives the two read-
ings from a single lexical entry for von with maximally simple lexical content: 
CAUSE (c, c’). Our compositional account includes measures to solve type con-
flicts — always provided that these are lexically sanctioned. That is, our analysis 
advocates an approach towards coercion that takes the potential to reinterpret and 
adapt expressions according to combinatoric demands to be basically a matter of 
lexical semantics rather than being guided by general pragmatic strategies alone. 
We see this approach as providing a promising perspective for developing a suffi-
ciently restrictive model of lexical semantics that is able to properly account for 
the observed flexibility and adaptivity of lexical meaning while adhering to com-
positionality as the core combinatoric principle. Further characteristic features of 
the interpretation of causal von modifiers such as their inferential behavior or the 
holistic effect on the interpretation of the internal argument of stative von could 
be explained as following from independently motivated conceptual assumptions 
concerning the spatiotemporal grounding of causation. Our analysis makes a 
strong case for assuming a stative notion of causation on a par with eventive cau-
sation. We argued that the two variants differ only in terms of the type of their 
arguments: events or tropes. All further differences could be derived from very 
general assumptions concerning the ontological nature of events and tropes as 
spatiotemporal particulars. 
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